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On January 2, 2014, Sergio Garcia became the first known
undocumented immigrant in the United States with a license to practice
law. He arrived in the United States as an infant in the late 1970’s, after his
father arranged for a couple with United States citizenship to pose as his
parents and bring him across the United States-Mexico border.1 Upon
arrival, Mr. Garcia lived with his parents and five siblings in Chico,
California until age nine, when he returned to Mexico with his mother.2 At
age seventeen, Mr. Garcia came back to the United States, entering the
country illegally, lying on the floorboards of a pick-up truck.3 Now thirtysix years old, Mr. Garcia has since graduated from the California Northern
School of Law, passed the California state bar exam, and was granted
admission to the State Bar of California in 2009.4 Although his law license
was rescinded two weeks later because of his immigration status,5 a
California law enacted in October 2013 made it possible for Mr. Garcia to
regain his license and become the first known undocumented immigrant
admitted to any state bar in the country.6 Others like him, however, have
not had similar success.7
On March 6, 2014, the Supreme Court of Florida determined that
twenty-six-year-old Jose Godinez-Samperio was ineligible for admission to
the Florida State Bar because of his status as an undocumented immigrant.
Mr. Godinez-Samperio came to the United States with his parents at age

1. See Deborah Hastings, Undocumented Immigrants May Practice Law Under New
California Legislation Spurred by Sergio Garcia’s Long, Tortured Quest, N.Y. DAILY NEWS
(Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/spurred-man-tortured-journeycalifornia-state-undocumented-immigrants-lawyers-article-1.1482225.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See Robin Abcarian, Sergio Garcia Will Practice Law, and He Will Make a
Killing, L.A.TIMES (Sept. 6, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/sep/06/local/la-me-lnsergio-garcia-law-20130906 (noting that Mr. Garcia had about fifteen Spanish-speaking
clients during that two-week period before his law license was rescinded).
5. See Cindy Y. Rodriguez & Jacqueline Hurtado, Undocumented Immigrant’s Bid
for California Law License Heads to Court, CNN (Sept. 4, 2013, 7:56 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/04/us/undocumented-lawyer-law-license/.
6. See ASSOCIATED PRESS, Court Grants Law License to Man in US Illegally (Jan. 2,
2014, 6:50 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/calif-rule-law-license-immigrant (reporting
that the unanimous ruling of the California Supreme Court is one “advocates hope will open
the door to millions of immigrants seeking to enter other professions such as medicine,
accounting and teaching.”).
7. See id. (reporting that “the court made clear the only reason it granted Garcia’s
request is that California recently approved a law that specifically authorizes the state to give
law licenses to immigrants who are here illegally.”).
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nine, and has since remained in the country permanently.8 His family
entered the United States with tourist visas, but never returned to their
home country of Mexico.9 Growing up in Florida, Mr. Godinez-Samperio
went on to become valedictorian of his high school class, earned a
scholarship to the New College of Florida and graduated from the Florida
State University School of Law with honors.10
Despite those
accomplishments, the Florida Supreme Court determined that without a
state law like the one that prompted Mr. Garcia’s case, federal law prohibits
Mr. Godinez-Samperio’s admission to the Florida State Bar because of his
status as an undocumented immigrant.11
This Note will examine how inconsistencies in immigration policy on
education, employment, and professional licensure impact undocumented
immigrants who have been raised and educated in the United States, and
chose to pursue a degree in law. Although the federal government and
many states have taken steps to encourage education for children brought to
this country illegally, a 1996 federal prohibition on “public benefits” for
undocumented immigrants, which tangentially includes law licenses,
creates a professional glass ceiling for United States-educated young people
seeking to enter the legal profession. The discussion that follows will
examine existing law governing education and employment for
undocumented students, with an emphasis on those studying to practice
law.12 It will explain the disconnect between immigration policies that
allow United States-educated undocumented students to attend college, earn
a law degree, and gain employment, and a federal law that prohibits those
same students from obtaining the license required for their chosen
profession.13 Finally, this Note recommends that the Department of
Homeland Security promulgate a regulation interpreting the federal
prohibition on “public benefits” to permit state bar eligibility for young
people who qualify for the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals

8. See Bill Kaczor, Illegal Immigrant in Fla. Fights for Law License, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Oct. 2, 2012, 6:23 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/fla-justices-question-lawlicense-immigrant.
9. See id.
10. See Chelsea Silvia, A Pathway to the Legal Profession, 45 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L.
REV. 367, 368 (2014).
11. See Fla. Bd. Bar Exam’rs Re Question as to Whether Undocumented Immigrants
are Eligible for Admission to the Fla. Bar, 134 So.3d 432, 437 (Fla. 2014) (holding that
unauthorized immigrants are ineligible for admission to the Florida State Bar).
12. See infra Part IV.A.
13. See infra Part III.
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(DACA) program.14 Currently, DACA provides temporary relief from the
threat of deportation, and offers an opportunity for United States-educated
undocumented immigrants to seek lawful employment in the United States.
This Note will argue those employment opportunities should include a
chance to enter the legal profession as well.15
II. Background
A. Classifying Immigrants in the United States
At the outset, it is important to consider the various classifications
given to those living in the United States who were not born in this country.
Under federal immigration law, those who are not natural-born citizens are
considered “aliens.”16 The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
classifies aliens as either “immigrants” or “nonimmigrants” depending on
the purpose and length of their stay in the United States.17
“Nonimmigrants” enter the country on a temporary basis, usually for
tourism, work or education, and must demonstrate an intention to leave the
country at the end of their authorized stay.18 “Immigrants” are those who
intend to live permanently in the United States.19 Immigrants with an
immigrant visa, typically referred to as a “green card,” have legal
permanent resident status in the United States.20 Legal permanent residents
are authorized to live and work in the United States permanently.21
“Undocumented” describes those living in the United States without any
type of legal status. It includes those who entered the country illegally, like

14. See infra Part IV.B., note 158.
15. See infra Part IV.B.
16. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(3) (2010).
17. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(15) (2010).
18. See Glossary of Terms, IMMIGRATION EQUALITY, http://immigrationequality.
org/get-legal-help/our-legal-resources/immigration-101/glossary-of-terms/ (last visited Feb.
11, 2015) (“Many non-immigrant visas require applicants to prove that they do not intend to
remain in the U.S. permanently by demonstrating strong economic and family ties to their
home country.”).
19. See id. (“The term ‘immigrant’ is often used more broadly to mean any person
who is not a U.S. citizen.”).
20. See id. (defining “green card” as “the informal term for ‘an alien registration card’
or Form I-551,” which is proof of legal permanent resident status).
21. See id.
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Mr. Garcia, or stayed past the expiration date of their temporary visa, like
Mr. Godinez-Samperio.22
An immigrant visa for legal permanent resident status is normally
obtained through family or employer sponsorship, but the INA limits the
number issued annually.23 As of 2010, for example, there were
approximately four million pending applications in the family-sponsored
preference category.24 Mr. Garcia, who is awaiting the approval of an
immigration petition filed by his father nineteen years ago, is just one
example of the millions seeking a visa for legal permanent resident status in
the United States.25
In addition to the INA cap on family and employer sponsorship, there
are also limits on the percentage of visas issued annually to applicants from
particular countries.26 High demand, coupled with a limited supply scheme,
has caused the State Department to develop lengthy waiting lists, where
individuals like Mr. Garcia and Mr. Godinez-Samperio are placed in a “visa
queue” and must wait for their “priority date” to become available. 27 Once
that priority date arrives, the individual is eligible to apply for an immigrant
visa.28 For those from Mexico, China, India, and the Philippines, who
comprise the vast majority of green card applicants, this process can be
particularly arduous.29 An unmarried, adult child of legal permanent
22. See id. (noting that “undocumented” may also refer “to those who overstayed their
allotted time here, or those who violated the terms of their legal status.”).
23. See Visa Availability and Priority Dates, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS.,
http://www.uscis.gov/green-card/green-card-processes-and-procedures/visa-availabilitypriority-dates (last updated June 15, 2011) (“Family sponsored preference categories are
limited to 226,000 per year and employment based preference visas are limited to 140,000
per year.”).
24. See Stuart Anderson, Family Immigration: The Long Wait to Immigrate, THE
NAT’L
FOUND.
FOR
A M.
POL’Y
1,
1
(2010),
available
at
http://carnegie.org/fileadmin/Media/Publications/NFAP_Policy_Brief_Family_Immigration.
pdf (according to data from the U.S. State Department and the Department of Homeland
Security).
25. See generally Abcarian, supra note 4.
26. See Visa Availability and Priority Dates, supra note 23 (providing information on
visa availability and priority dates).
27. See id. (noting that the length of time individuals must wait before receiving an
immigrant visa depends upon, “[t]he demand for and supply of immigrant visa numbers,”
“[t]he per country visa limitations,” and “[t]he number of visas allocated for your particular
preference category”).
28. See id.
29. See Anderson, supra note 24, at 3 (“Enormous backlogs and waiting times plague
the family preference categories. For example, the wait time for a U.S. citizen petitioning
for a brother or sister from the Philippines exceeds 20 years.”).
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residents from Mexico, for example, will wait an average of seventeen
years to receive a green card as a family-sponsored immigrant.30 Mr.
Garcia—whose application was filed in 1994—expects to receive his green
card sometime in 2019.31 Only after an applicant has obtained a green card
and has lived as a legal permanent resident in the United States for five
years, may the applicant begin the naturalization process to apply for
United States citizenship.32
These statistics demonstrate the lengthy and complicated route to
becoming a legal permanent resident, and eventually, a United States
citizen. And while it may be true that most undocumented immigrants made
the conscious decision to enter this country illegally and involve themselves
in that process, many of those who entered as children, like Mr. Garcia and
Mr. Godinez-Samperio, did not voluntarily make that choice. Nevertheless,
this same path to citizenship applies those children, and it provides a useful
starting point for considering the educational opportunities available to this
country’s youngest undocumented immigrants.
B. Primary Education for Undocumented Immigrants
As of 2013, there were approximately 11.7 million undocumented
immigrants living in the United States.33 It is estimated that roughly 1.1
million of them are children under the age of eighteen.34 These
undocumented immigrant children have had the opportunity to access
public education in primary and secondary schools nationwide, since the

30. See id. at 1 (noting that 26,266 visas are issues in this particular category every
year, and that the average wait time for all other countries is eight years).
31. See Abcarian, supra note 4.
32. See I Am a Permanent Resident: How Do I Apply for U.S. Citizenship?, U.S.
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (Feb. 2013), available at
http://www.uscis.gov/
sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/B3en.pdf (explaining that applying for U.S. citizenship
is also possible for those who have been a permanent resident for at least three years, and
who are “married to and living in a marriage relationship with your U.S. citizen husband or
wife; or [h]ave honorable service in the U.S. military.”).
33. See Jeffrey S. Passel et al., Population Decline of Unauthorized Illegal Immigrants
Stalls, May Have Reversed, PEW RES. CTR. 1, 6 (Sept. 23, 2013), available at
http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/2013/09/Unauthorized-Sept-2013-FINAL.pdf
(“The
estimated number of unauthorized immigrants peaked at 12.2 million in 2007 and fell to 11.3
million in 2009, breaking a rising trend that had held for decades.”).
34. See Fact Sheet: An Overview of College-Bound Undocumented Students,
EDUCATORS FOR FAIR CONSIDERATION, http://www.e4fc.org/images/Fact_Sheet.pdf (last
updated Jan. 2012).
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United States Supreme Court ruling in Plyler v. Doe,35 decided in 1982. In
Plyler, the Court held that a Texas statute allowing local school districts to
deny public education to children based on immigration status was a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution.36 Rejecting arguments about the “harsh
economic effects” of undocumented immigrants entering public schools,37
the Court determined that “education provides the basic tools by which
individuals might lead economically productive lives to the benefit of us
all.”38 The Court also recognized the special circumstance of children
brought to this country illegally, acknowledging that they “can affect
neither their parents’ conduct nor their own status.”39
Plyler is now recognized as the decision that “opened the schoolhouse
doors to untold numbers of children who might otherwise be deprived of a
basic education.”40 Mr. Garcia and Mr. Godinez-Samperio are just two
examples of those who benefitted from the Supreme Court’s decision. Not
only has Plyler survived unsuccessful attacks to limit its holding, it has
continued to expand the opportunities available to undocumented children
today.41
35. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (holding that the Texas statute could not
“deny a discrete group of innocent children the free public education that it offers to other
children residing within its borders, that denial must be justified by a showing that it furthers
some substantial state interest.”).
36. See id. at 202 (reasoning that although undocumented immigrant children are not
U.S. citizens, they are still protected by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which guarantees that no state shall, “deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws”) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. XIV, 0 1).
37. See id. at 228 (“There is no evidence in the record suggesting that illegal entrants
impose any significant burden on the State’s economy. To the contrary, the available
evidence suggests that illegal aliens underutilize public services, while contributing their
labor to the local economy and tax money to the state fisc.”).
38. See id. at 221 (“We cannot ignore the significant social costs borne by our Nation
when select groups are denied the means to absorb the values and skills upon which our
social order rests.”).
39. Id. at 220 (stating that unlike undocumented children, “‘[t]heir parents have the
ability to conform their conduct to societal norms,’ and presumably the ability to remove
themselves from the States’ jurisdiction . . . . ”) (quoting Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762,
770 (1977)).
40. See Ben Winograd, After 30 Years, Plyler v. Doe Decision Survives but Remains
Under Attack, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (June 15, 2012), http://immigrationimpact.
com/2012/06/15/after-30-years-plyler-v-doe-decision-survives-but-remains-under-attack/.
41. See id. (describing a 1994 California ballot initiative known Proposition 187,
which would have forbidden undocumented students from enrolling in public schools but
was prohibited from taking effect, and a 2011 Alabama initiative that would have required
school districts to report students’ citizenship or immigration status to state authorities).
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C. Opportunities for Higher Education

Protected by the Court’s decision in Plyler, approximately 65,000
undocumented students now graduate from United States’ high schools
every year.42 It is estimated that between 7,000 and 13,000 of those
undocumented high school graduates are currently enrolled in colleges and
universities across the country.43 The growing number of undocumented
high school graduates beginning to set their sights on college has also
caused legislative focus to shift toward access to higher education for those
who have come to be known as “Plyler students.”44
1. Federal Law
Currently, no state or federal law expressly prohibits the admission of
undocumented immigrants to public or private colleges and universities in
the United States.45 In fact, at the federal level, there have been several
legislative attempts to encourage higher education for United Stateseducated undocumented youth for more than a decade. These attempts have
largely focused on passing the Development, Relief, and Education for
Alien Minors (DREAM) Act,46 first introduced in the Senate in 2001.47
Originally proposed by Senators Dick Durbin and Orrin Hatch, the
42. See EDUCATORS FOR FAIR CONSIDERATION, supra note 34.
43. See id.
44. See Miriam Jordan, Illegal Immigrants’ New Lament: Have Degree, No Job,
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 26, 2005), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB111447898329816736
(reporting that, “[i]n 2001, Texas became the first state to pass a law allowing undocumented
immigrant students who graduated from a state high school to pay resident tuition at public
universities.”).
45. See THE COLLEGE BOARD, Advising Undocumented Students (2012),
http://professionals.collegeboard.com/guidance/financial-aid/undocumented-students
(last
visited Feb. 6, 2015) (noting, however, that institutional policies on admitting undocumented
students vary, and that in Virginia, for example, some four-year colleges will refuse
admission to applicants who are unable to verify their citizenship or legal residency status).
46. See S. 952, 112th Cong. (2011) (representing the most recent version of the
DREAM Act introduced in the U.S. Senate on May 11, 2011); see also H.R. 1842, 112th
Cong. (2011) (representing the most recent version of the DREAM Act introduced in the
U.S. House of Representatives on May 11, 2011).
47. See Roberto G. Gonzales, Young Lives on Hold: The College Dreams of
Undocumented
Students,
COLLEGE
BOARD
22
(2009),
available
at
http://professionals.collegeboard.com/profdownload/young-lives-on-hold-college-board.pdf
(noting that the bill “has been repeatedly introduced and debated in Congress” and that
“[a]lthough the DREAM Act has not yet been enacted into law, it has a large base of support
both in and out of Congress”).
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DREAM Act seeks to extend conditional permanent resident status to
young, undocumented immigrants who pursue higher education in the
United States.48 Specifically, the Act would allow those brought to this
country illegally as children to remain in the United States without the
threat of deportation for up to six years while they attend college or serve in
the military.49 Although the criteria to qualify for conditional permanent
residency has been modified since 2001, the plan generally requires that the
undocumented individual: (1) has been continuously present in the United
States for five years prior to the bill’s passage, (2) entered the United States
before the age of fifteen, (3) has earned a high school diploma or GED and
(4) is under the age of thirty-five.50 Under the most recent version of the
DREAM Act, the undocumented student would become a permanent legal
resident at the end of this six-year period, provided they have earned an
associate’s degree, completed at least two years of military service, or
worked for two years toward the completion of a bachelor’s degree. 51
Congress has not approved the DREAM Act, but in early 2012, President
Obama used his executive power to promote a federal policy that
effectively encourages higher education for young undocumented
immigrants, with provisions similar to the DREAM Act.
Following that directive from the President, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) began the Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals (DACA) program in June 2012.52 This federal policy allows DHS
48. See THE DREAM ACT PORTAL, http://dreamact.info (last visited Feb. 6, 2015).
49. See Gonzalez, supra note 47, at 22 (noting that the “DREAM Act is designed to
allow undocumented immigrant youth who were brought to the country years ago as
children to obtain legal permanent resident status if they remain in school through high
school graduation and go on to college or military service”).
50. See S. 952, 112th Cong. § 3 (2011) (requiring additionally that “the alien has been
of good moral character” and has not been convicted for any crime carrying more than a one
year sentence under state or federal law).
51. See id. at § 5 (noting that legal permanent resident status will be revoked if the
undocumented student fails to maintain “good moral character” or “abandon[s]” residence in
the U.S. for more than 365 days during the conditional period); see also NAT’L IMMIGR. LAW
CTR., DREAM Act Summary 2 (2011), available at https://nilc.org/dreamsummary.html
(noting that “[s]tudents with conditional permanent resident status would be able to work,
drive, go to school, and otherwise participate normally in day-to-day activities on the same
terms as other Americans”).
52. See Memorandum on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to
Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children [hereinafter DACA Memo], from
Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of the Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to David V. Aguilar, Acting
Comm’r, U.S. Customs and Border Prot., Alejandro Mayorkas, Dir., U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Servs., and John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration on Customs Enforcement 1
(June 15, 2012), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-
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officers to exercise prosecutorial discretion in the pursuit of deportation
proceedings against individuals: (1) who arrived in the United States before
age sixteen, (2) are under the age of thirty, (3) have lived in the United
States for at least five years, and (4) either have a high school diploma or
are currently enrolled in school.53 In support of President Obama’s
directive to implement the policy, Secretary Napolitano’s memorandum
emphasized that immigration laws should not be “blindly enforced,” as they
are not intended to “remove productive young people to countries where
they may not have lived or even speak the language.”54
2. State Law
Like DACA, policies designed to protect undocumented students and
encourage the pursuit of higher education have been enacted at the state
level as well. Currently, sixteen states have policies that allow
undocumented students who completed their primary and secondary
education in the state to pay the same tuition rates as in-state residents.55
Three states—California, Texas, and Illinois—offer government-funded
financial aid to undocumented college students as well.56
Educational rights for undocumented immigrants also continue to be
part of an ongoing debate at the state level. In 2012, for example, sixtynine bills related to education for undocumented students were introduced
in twenty-five state legislatures.57 Many of these focused on improving
discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf (instructing that prosecutorial
discretion is to be exercised on a case by case basis only if the individual satisfies a
particular set of criteria).
53. See id. (noting that additional requirements include the individual have no prior
felony or “significant misdemeanor” convictions and does not “pose a threat to national
security or public safety”).
54. See id. (adding that “[a]s a general matter, these individuals lacked the intent to
violate the law”).
55. See NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, Undocumented Student Tuition: State
Action (May 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/educ/undocumented-student-tuitionstate-action.aspx (reporting that the following states have equivalent in-state tuition rate laws
for undocumented students: California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland,
Minnesota, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas,
Utah, and Washington).
56. See NAT’L ASS’N OF STUDENT FIN. AID ADM’RS, Inclusive State Policy
Environments: Undocumented Students, http://www.nasfaa.org/states/undocumented.
/Inclusive_State_Policy_Environments__Undocumented_Students.aspx (last visited Oct. 11,
2013).
57. See NATI’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 2012 Immigration-Related Laws, Bills,
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access to higher education, suggesting that more changes may be on the
way.58
D. Access to Employment and the Practice of Law
Although employment for undocumented immigrants is governed
exclusively by federal law, and bar admission is regulated by the states,
developments at both governmental levels support the provision of law
licenses to qualified undocumented immigrants.
Under current federal law, the Immigration Reform and Control Act
(IRCA) of 198659 makes it a crime for employers to hire or recruit
undocumented immigrants not authorized to work in the United States.60
Like its provisions encouraging higher education, however, DACA
represents an acknowledgment of the unique circumstances facing those
brought to this country as children.61 As of June 2012, those approved for
deferred action under DACA are eligible for employment authorization to
work in the United States, renewable every two years.62 For those approved
for DACA, like Mr. Godinez-Samperio, this serves as an additional form of
encouragement for young undocumented immigrants to pursue an education
that will lead to their career of choice.63 If that career requires a law license,
legal developments within the past half-century provide additional support
for the proposition that qualified undocumented immigrants may be
admitted to state bar associations. Although foreign-born individuals were
and Resolutions in the States: Jan. 1-March 31, 2012, http://www.ncsl.org/
research/immigration/2012-immigration-laws-bills-and-resolutions.aspx#5 (last visited Feb.
6, 2015) (noting that in 2011, 140 bills related education and immigration were introduced in
37 states).
58. See NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, In-State Tuition and Unauthorized
Immigrant Students (Feb. 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/in-state-tuitionand-unauthorized-immigrants.aspx (reporting that in 2013, four states—Colorado,
Minnesota, New Jersey and Oregon—enacted new legislation permitting in-state tuition
rates for undocumented immigrant students).
59. See Immigr. Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359
(1986).
60. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A) (adding that this restriction applies, “regardless of
whether such alien has received prior official authorization to . . . reside in the United States
and regardless of any future official action which may be taken with respect to such alien”).
61. See DACA Memo, supra note 52 (noting that “[o]ur Nation’s immigration laws
must be enforced in a strong and sensible manner. They are not designed to be blindly
enforced without consideration given to the individual circumstances of each case.”).
62. See id.
63. See Silvia, supra note 10, at 368.
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largely prohibited from practicing law in the United States for nearly two
centuries,64 a pair of state supreme court decisions in the early 1970’s
signaled a shift in the treatment of state bar applicants born abroad.65
In 1971, the Alaska Supreme Court, in In re Park,66 invalidated a
citizenship requirement for admission to the Alaska State Bar, because it
was unrelated to an attorney’s fitness and competency to practice law.67
The Park court also rejected concerns over loyalty and constitutional
allegiance, disapproving of the argument that only natural-born citizens
could demonstrate “an ‘appreciation of the spirit of American institutions,’”
required to practice law.68
A year later, the California Supreme Court expanded upon the
rationale in Park. In Raffaelli v. Committee Of Bar Examiners69 the court
ruled that citizenship, as a requirement for state bar admission, violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.70 There, the court
found that California’s practice of excluding permanent resident aliens from
admission to the State Bar had no rational basis.71 The Rafaelli court also
rejected the argument that a lawyer, as an “officer of the court” must be a
citizen—calling the conclusion a “non sequitur,” with “no demonstrable
64. See, e.g., Ex parte Thompson, 10 N.C. 355, 364 (1824) (prohibiting two European
immigrants from practicing law in North Carolina, citing fears of “foreign allegiance,” “alien
prejudices,” and concerns over allowing the practice of law to “fall into such hands as would
lower it in the national opinion”).
65. See Kevin R. Johnson, Bias in the Legal System? An Essay on the Eligibility of
Undocumented Immigrants to Practice Law, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1655, 1660 (2013)
(“The 1970s saw the beginning of a general expansion of the constitutional rights of
immigrants.”).
66. See In re Park, 484 P.2d 690 (Alaska 1971).
67. See id. at 692 (“The interests to be protected are the public’s interest in having
competent practitioners, [and] the bar’s interest in ensuring that all attorneys in the state are
qualified, thereby protecting its good name and reputation, and the courts’ interest in having
reliable and officers . . . .”).
68. See id. at 693 (noting petitioner had been in the U.S. fourteen years when the case
was argued, receiving his undergraduate and legal education here, and leading the court to
conclude, “it could be assumed petitioner would appreciate the spirit of American
institutions as much as one born . . . [in] the United States”).
69. See Raffaelli v. Comm. of Bar Exam’rs, 7 Cal. 3d 288 (Cal. 1972).
70. See id. at 294 (“A State cannot exclude a person from the practice of law or from
any other occupation in a manner or for reasons that contravene the Due Process or Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
71. See id. (“‘We recognize the importance of leaving States free to select their own
bars, but it is equally important that the State not exercise this power in an arbitrary or
discriminatory manner . . . .’”) (quoting Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 353 U.S. 232, 238–
39 (1957)).
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nexus between that status and a requirement that every lawyer be a United
States citizen.”72 On this point, the Raffaelli court noted that although
states may create rigorous standards for issuing law licenses, any given
qualification “must have a rational connection with the applicant’s fitness
or capacity to practice law.”73
By 1973, the issue of citizenship as a prerequisite for state bar
admission reached the United States Supreme Court, in In re Griffiths.74 As
in Raffaelli, the Court found that while a state has an interest in regulating
the character and fitness of its attorneys, a citizenship requirement for state
bar admission violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.75 In Griffiths, the Court rejected arguments by the state of
Connecticut that “the special role of the lawyer justifies excluding aliens.”76
Rather, the Court relied on Park and Raffaelli, emphasizing that depriving
individuals of state bar admission because of citizenship is “inherently
suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.”77 It ruled that because noncitizens “pay taxes, support the economy . . . and contribute in myriad other
ways to our society,” it is proper for states to “bear a heavy burden” when
depriving these individuals of opportunities for employment.78
In sum, these decisions provide a strong basis for allowing
undocumented immigrants like Mr. Godinez-Samperio to become licensed
attorneys.79 Consideration of these decisions, coupled with the educational
72. See id. at 300–01 (“The traditional expression that a lawyer is an ‘officer of the
court’ has not often been explicated. He clearly is not a public office-holder in the literal
sense (citation omitted) but we need not here explore the broader, metaphorical meanings of
the phrase.”).
73. See id. at 294 (quoting Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 353 U.S. 232, 238–39
(1957)).
74. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
75. See id. at 724 (“Even in applying permissible standards, officers of a State cannot
exclude an applicant when there is no basis for their finding that he fails to meet these
standards, or when their action is invidiously discriminatory.”) (quoting Schware v. Bd. of
Bar Exam’rs, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957)).
76. See id. at 728–29 (rejecting the argument that exclusion from the practice of law is
a an extension of the prohibition on an alien’s right to vote in every state, and their
disqualification from holding public office).
77. See id. at 721 (noting that “[c]lassifications based on alienage, like those based on
nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny. Aliens as a
class are a prime example of a ‘discrete and insular’ minority for whom such heightened
judicial solicitude is appropriate,” (quoting Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372
(1971)) (citing United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938))).
78. See id. at 722
79. See ASSOCIATED PRESS, supra note 6.
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rights extended in Plyler and the protections afforded by DACA, are
particularly in this regard, because federal law still makes state bar
admission for undocumented immigrants a legal impossibility in any state
other than California.80 Thus far, this debate has focused primarily on the
personal experiences of Mr. Garcia and Mr. Godinez-Samperio, but such
controversies could become more common, particularly as Plyler students
graduate from law school, sit for the bar exam, and enter the job market.81
III. The Debate Over Undocumented Immigrants’ Right to Practice Law
A. Introduction
On September 4, 2013, nearly four years after his law license was
rescinded, the California Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Mr.
Garcia’s case for admission to the California State Bar.82 On September 6,
2013, just two days after those oral arguments concluded, the California
legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 102483—making California the first
state ever to allow admittance to its Bar, “an applicant who is not lawfully
present in the United States [who] has fulfilled the requirements for
admission to practice law . . . .”84 That law took effect January 1, 2014,85
and on January 2, 2014, a unanimous California Supreme Court helped
make Mr. Garcia the first known undocumented immigrant with a law
license in the United States.86
In contrast to Mr. Garcia’s personal victory is the outcome of Mr. GodinezSamperio’s quest for a law license.87 In the absence of a state law like
80. See 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a), Pub. L. No. 113-31 (2013) (making aliens who are not
qualified aliens or nonimmigrants ineligible for state or local public benefits, including any
“professional license,” as defined by §1621(c)(1)(A)).
81. See supra Part II.C.
82. See In re Garcia, 315 P.3d 117, 123 (Cal. 2014).
83. See A.B. No. 1024, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013); id. at 8 (reporting that the bill passed
29-5 in the California Senate and 62-4 in the California Assembly).
84. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6064(b) (2014) (providing further that “the
Supreme Court may admit that applicant as an attorney at law in all the courts of this state
and may direct an order to be entered upon its records to that effect”).
85. See In re Garcia, 315 P.3d at 124 (noting that “[a]fter the legislation enacting
6064(b) was signed into law, we vacated submission in this matter and indicated that the
matter would be resubmitted on January 2, 2014, after the new statute took effect.”).
86. See ASSOCIATED PRESS, supra note 6.
87. See infra Part III.B. (discussing issues of character, fitness and employability with
respect to undocumented immigrants and the practice of law).
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California’s, the Supreme Court of Florida relied on federal immigration
law to determine that Mr. Godinez-Samperio was ineligible for admission
to the Florida Bar.88 In its March 6, 2014 opinion, the Court reasoned that,
“a license issued by a state cannot permit an unauthorized alien to perform
work if such conduct is prohibited by federal law,” as, “[t]he federal power
to determine immigration policy is well settled.”89
The 1996 federal restriction behind these decisions provides a useful
starting point for examining the inconsistencies in federal immigration law
and policy.
B. Application of Existing Federal Law to Bar Admissions
Currently, federal law renders undocumented immigrants ineligible for
“any State or local public benefit.”90 Congress implemented this restriction
in 1996, as part of the Professional Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Act (PRWORA).91 PRWORA was intended to reform the way America’s
poor received federal cash assistance, and “end[] welfare as we know it.”92
For undocumented immigrants, however, the law’s effect reached beyond
financial support.93
Codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1621, the ban on “public benefit[s]” for
undocumented immigrants includes any “professional license, or
commercial license provided by an agency of a State or local government or
by appropriated funds of a state or local government.”94 Whether this

88. See Fla. Bd. Bar Exam’rs Re Question as to Whether Undocumented Immigrants
are Eligible for Admission to the Fla. Bar, 134 So.3d 432, 434 (Fla. 2014) (“[A] a license
issued by a state cannot permit an unauthorized alien to perform work if such conduct is
prohibited by federal law.”).
89. See id. at 4 (quoting Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498 (2012)).
90. See 8 U.S.C. §1621(a).
91. See The Professional Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, H.R. 3734 § 401(a)(2), 104th Cong. (1996) (noting that one purpose of the bill was to
“end the dependence of needy parents on government benefits by promoting job preparation,
work and marriage.”).
92. See BRENDON O’CONNOR, A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WELFARE
SYSTEM: WHEN IDEAS HAVE CONSEQUENCES 228 (2004) (noting that “beyond Clinton’s
positive rhetoric, the PRWORA offered a much harsher world to the genuinely poor and
needy.”).
93. See id.
94. See Pub. L. No. 113-31 (2013). (codified at 8 U.S.C. §1621(c)(1)(A)).
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language applies to law licenses is the first point of contention over
admitting undocumented immigrants to state bar associations.95
The first consideration is whether a state court should be considered a
“state agency” when it functions as the body charged with issuing law
licenses. The Attorney General of California, in her brief supporting Mr.
Garcia, argued that § 1621 cannot be read to apply to the California
Supreme Court in its capacity for determining state bar admissions. As head
of the judicial branch, the Attorney General argued that the Court is “no
more a ‘state agency’ than is the Legislature.”96 As to the Court’s
relationship with the state bar association, the Attorney General contended
that the bar, “has consistently been articulated as that of an administrator or
adjunct,” and that the final authority to admit, deny or discipline attorneys
rests with the state supreme court.97
The issue is further complicated by the fact that Congress did not
define “agency of the state” when it approved PRWORA.98 Accordingly,
Mr. Garcia’s supporters argued the “usual and ordinary meaning” of the
term should apply, noting that “agency” is generally understood to mean
“an entity within the Executive Branch of government that acts as an
‘agent’ of the Executive to enforce and administer laws enacted through the
legislative process.”99 The California Attorney General also noted that
when a state court uses its discretion to allow an individual to practice law,
“it is exercising its inherent, constitutional authority as the head of the
judicial branch,” and should not be considered an “agency” in that
regard.100
95. See Brief for Kamala D. Harris et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, In re
Garcia, 315 P.3d 117 (Cal. 2014) (No. S202512) 2012 WL 3236333 [hereinafter Harris
Amici] (explaining that because the language of §1621(c)(1)(A) “qualifies the class of
professional licenses,” it should not be read to include all types of licenses).
96. See id. at 7 (finding that state courts should be treated as “a separate department in
the scheme of our state government” (quoting Brydonjack v. State Bar, 208 Cal. 439, 442
(1929)).
97. See id. (quoting Keller v. State Bar of Cal. 47 Cal. 3d 1152, 1160 (1989), rev’d on
other grounds, Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 110 S. Ct. 2228 (1990).
98. See Harris Amici, supra note 95, at 17 (arguing that like “Justice Scalia’s
memorable admonition that Congress ‘does not . . . hide elephants in mouseholes,’” it is
unlikely that Congress intended to regulate Bar Admissions in enacting PRWORA, as law
licensure is an area traditionally left to the states (quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assn.,
531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001)).
99. See Harris Amici, supra note 95, at 8 (quoting Green v. State of California, 42 Cal.
4th 254, 260 (2007)).
100. See id. at 9 (citing the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S.
333, 378–79 (1866), where the Court, in deciding the role of federal courts in the admitting
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Another contested issue is whether a state court uses “appropriated
funds of a state or local government” in administering law licenses.101 If so,
federal law flatly prohibits bar admission under § 1621.102 In Mr. Garcia’s
case, supporters contended that no “appropriated funds” are expended,
because bar admission does not rely on “state revenues allocated by
statute.”103 This argument is relies on the fact that state bar membership
fees are the primary source of funding to review law license applications,
making any use of state appropriated funds “de minimis.”104 Because
attorneys pay these fees out-of-pocket, and the cost is not subsidized by the
state, the Attorney General of California argued that a state court’s role in
issuing law licenses does not fall within the class of activities prohibited by
§ 1621.105
As the primary voice of opposition in Mr. Garcia’s case, the
Department of Justice (DOJ) argued that only a state law like that enacted
in California can override PRWORA’s prohibition.106 According to the
DOJ, use of the word “professional license” in § 1621 is evidence that
“Congress intended to act comprehensively in prohibiting the receipt of
such benefits by undocumented aliens.”107
attorneys to the federal bar, found that “admission or . . . exclusion is not the exercise of a
mere ministerial power. It is the exercise of judicial power, and has been so held in
numerous cases.”).
101. See Pub. L. No. 113-31 (2013) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §1621(c)(1)(A)).
102. See id.
103. See Harris Amici, supra note 95 at 10 n.6 (defining “appropriation” as “[t]he
exercise of control over property; a taking of possession . . . .” or “[a] legislative body’s act
of setting aside a sum of money for a public purpose.”) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
110 (8th ed. 2004)).
104. See In re Garcia, 315 P.3d 117, 128 (Cal. 2014) (noting that Mr. Garcia’s
supporters also that the “appropriated funds” language, “should be interpreted to refer only
to public benefits that involve the payment of money or funds to undocumented
immigrants . . .”).
105. See Harris Amici, supra note 95, at 10–11 (noting that “[a]pplicants for admission
to practice shall pay such reasonable fees, fixed by the board, as may be necessary to defray
the expense of administering the provisions of this chapter, relating to admission to
practice.’”) (quoting CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6063 (2013)).
106. See Brief for Stuart F. Delery, et al. at 3, as Amici Curiae for the United States of
America Opposing Petitioner, In re Garcia, 315 P.3d 117 (Cal. 2014) (No. S202512) 2012
WL 3236333 [hereinafter DOJ Amici] (arguing “Title IV of [PRWORA] prohibits certain
categories of aliens from obtaining certain public benefits, unless a state enactment directs
otherwise.”).
107. See id. at 6–7 (determining that “[o]ther than the law license at issue here, Mr.
Garcia and his supporters identify no other type of commercial or professional license which
is not provide by an agency, provided by appropriated funds, or both.”).
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With respect to the language of § 1621, the DOJ argued that the phrase
“any professional license” conclusively excludes undocumented immigrants
from the practice of law.108 Accordingly, the DOJ argued that the Court
should disregard arguments about the use and meaning of “agency” and
“appropriated funds” in Mr. Garcia’s case.109 Even if the Court chose to
consider that issue, the DOJ contended that state courts have always
received “appropriated funds,” meaning that § 1621’s ban on public
benefits plainly applies.110 More specifically, the DOJ noted that because
judges and court employees are paid out of state appropriated funds, § 1621
prohibits state bar admission for undocumented immigrants.111
The DOJ also discarded arguments about the funding and
responsibilities of the state bar association in issuing law licenses.112 While
it did not dispute that state bar associations bear a majority of the cost and
responsibility for determining candidates’ eligibility, the DOJ contended
that the actual amount of state funding is irrelevant. Specifically, the DOJ
noted that “[t]he statute does not speak of funds appropriated for a
particular purpose, or set a threshold amount of appropriated funds before
the prohibition kicks in.”113 Accordingly, the DOJ argued that § 1621
plainly applied to Mr. Garcia’s case, in the absence of a state law like the
one subsequently enacted in California.114

108. See id. at 9 (arguing “[t]here is no need to definitively determine the meaning of
‘agency’ . . . because Congress in any event covered the actions of this Court by making
section 1621 applicable when a ‘professional license’ is ‘provided . . . by appropriated funds
of a State or local government.’”) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1621(c)).
109. See id.
110. See id. (“[I]t is similarly undisputed that this Court and its officers are funded
through appropriations . . . [t]herefore, Mr. Garcia seeks a ‘professional license’ . . .
provided . . . by appropriated funds of a State or local government.’”) (citations omitted).
111. See DOJ Amici, supra note 106, at 11 (pointing out that this remains true, despite
the fact that “no funds have been set aside specifically for the granting of licenses by the
Court . . .”).
112. See id. at 10 (“The federal statute does not depend upon which entity performs the
background analysis of the application, but rather depends upon the source of funding
through which the license is ‘provided.’”).
113. Id. at 10–11 (arguing further that “the federal prohibition applies when
appropriated funds are used whether or not the relevant benefit is directly conferred by the
government . . . .”).
114. See id.
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C. The Division of Federal and State Control over Immigration and
Licensure
Although § 1621 represents the starting point in this debate, the topic
of state bar admissions also raises a more fundamental question about the
division of power between federal and state governments over
undocumented immigrants—particularly when policies conflict on issues
historically left to the states.
A substantial body of United States Supreme Court jurisprudence
supports the proposition that issuing law licenses is a traditional state
function.115 Accordingly, “Congress is well aware of the traditional
primacy of the state courts in regulating attorneys, so when it means to use
its power to regulate attorneys, it has done so in ways that leave no room
for doubt about its intentions.”116 This premise, coupled with the
ambiguous statement in § 1621, has led supporters to argue that Congress
did not intend to restrict states’ ability to make decisions about bar
admission based on immigration status.117 Rather, advocates note that
Congress “understands how to clearly indicate when it intends to impinge
on [state] authority,”118 and that “Congress could have simply made
undocumented immigrants ineligible for any state-issued professional
license, but it did not.”119
The counterpoint to this view, however, is that state action in the area
of immigration must also be considered in light of the power of the federal
government to “establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization” under Article I

115. See Harris Amici, supra note 95, at 12; see also N.Y. State Bar Ass’n. v. Fed.
Trade Comm’n, 276 F. Supp. 2d 110, 128 (2003) (stating that “the regulation of lawyers and
the practice of law have historically been recognized as the responsibility of the states, and
not the federal government); see also Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975)
(noting “[t]he interest of the States in regulating lawyers is especially greater since lawyers
are essential to the primary governmental function of administering justice and have
historically been ‘officers of the court’”).
116. See Harris Amici, supra note 95 at 11.
117. See id. at 19 (arguing that although Congress may legislate in areas traditionally
reserved for the states, “[t]his is an extraordinary power in a federalist system. It is a power
that we must assume Congress does not exercise lightly” (internal quotations omitted)
(quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461 (1991)).
118. Id. at 13 (comparing § 1621 to earlier Congressional actions applying to all
individuals, including the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) 18
U.S.C. § 1962, which states that is “unlawful for any person who has received any income
derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity . . .”(emphasis added)).
119. Id. at 16.
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of the Constitution.120 This has been interpreted by the DOJ to mean there
is “no doubt that Congress can enact a law rendering unauthorized aliens
ineligible for state benefits.”121 The reach of this constitutionally conferred
authority has also raised questions about the balance of power between
states and the federal government to regulate issues of immigration and
employment generally. The DOJ argues that because federal law has
“comprehensively regulated the field of alien employment,” it should also
govern any authorization or licensure required for that employment.122 In
support of this point, the DOJ noted that in Arizona v. United States,123 the
United States Supreme Court found that “state laws are preempted when
they conflict with federal law, including when they stand ‘as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and exclusion of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.”124 A law allowing undocumented individuals to obtain a law
license creates such an obstacle, according to the DOJ.125
In response to this Article I argument, advocates have raised a
competing constitutional concern—the Tenth Amendment. Also citing the
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona, the California Attorney
General noted that, “[i]n preemption analysis, courts should assume that the
historic police powers of the States are not superseded unless that was the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”126 Following that rationale,
advocates in Mr. Garcia’s case argued that § 1621—and its failure to define
operative terms such as “state agency” and “appropriated funds”—is an
insufficient basis for concluding that Congress expressly intended to
preempt the traditional and historical control that states have maintained
over law licenses.127
120. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
121. See DOJ Amici, supra note 106, at 11 (adding further that Congress has power
under the Constitution to “make the ineligibility provision applicable to all organs of state
government, including the courts.”).
122. Id. at 2 (“[A]dmission to the bar has no bearing on the application of the federal
statutes that govern an alien’s employment in the United States.”).
123. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (invalidating certain provisions of an Arizona immigration
law enacted in 2010, including a provision that made it a crime for undocumented
immigrants to work or apply for employment in the state).
124. Id. at 2495 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
125. See DOJ Amici, supra note 106, at 2 (reiterating that “[u]nder the governing
federal statutes, an alien’s employment authorization is determined solely by reference to
federal law.”).
126. See Harris Amici, supra note 95, at 20 (quoting Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2501).
127. See id. (noting that an “unambiguous statement is missing from section 1621” to
suggest Congress meant to restrict the power of the state courts with respect to state bar
admissions).
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Despite these objections, the DOJ contends that § 1621 addresses any
federalism concerns by providing for the “enactment of a state law . . .
[that] affirmatively provides for such eligibility.” 128 This provision is what
allowed for the California law prompted by Mr. Garcia’s case. Even absent
this provision, the DOJ noted that an undocumented immigrant could not
legally raise a claim challenging § 1621 as an infringement on traditional
state power, because of their undocumented status in the United States.129
On this point, the DOJ also noted that even if an undocumented immigrant
were able to obtain a law license under state law, they are still prohibited
from working anywhere in the United States, unless it is authorized by
federal law.130 The distinction between licensure and employment is
considered further in the following section.
D. The Distinction Between Licensure and Employment
While law licenses raise questions of federalism and the ability of state
courts to determine bar admission independent of federal policy, the issue
of employment after licensure is a separate matter. The employment rights
of undocumented immigrants are governed exclusively by federal law—and
unlike limitations on law licenses, may not be overridden by the action of a
state legislature.131
Under current federal law, it is unlawful “to hire, or to recruit or refer
for a fee, for employment in the United States an alien knowing the alien is
an unauthorized alien.”132 Congress adopted that provision in 1986 as part
of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA). 133 That Act was part
of larger effort to reduce and deter illegal immigration into the United
States.134 Under IRCA, employers are required to verify the immigration
128. See DOJ Amici, supra note 106, at 12 (referencing 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d) and noting
that “Congress has accommodated state interests by allowing States to enact measures that
would provide benefits to unlawfully present aliens.”).
129. See id. (arguing that this further supports the position that Mr. Garcia cannot
challenge the § 1621 on Tenth Amendment grounds).
130. See id.
131. See The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), Pub. L. No. 99603, 100 Stat. 3445; 8 U.S.C. § 1324 et seq. [hereinafter IRCA] (detailing the prohibition on
employment of undocumented immigrants and providing criminal penalties for any
employer found in violation).
132. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A) (2013).
133. See IRCA.
134. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR.
SERVS.,available at http://www.uscis.gov/tools/glossary/immigration-reform-and-control-
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status of any prospective employee and ensure that the individual is legally
authorized to work in the United States.135 In addition to its prohibition on
the employment of undocumented immigrants, IRCA also introduced civil
and criminal penalties for employers found in violation of the law. These
penalties include fines of up to $3,000 per unverified employee and
imprisonment of up to six months.136
These federal restrictions on employment are an obvious hurdle for
individuals like Mr. Garcia and Mr. Godinez-Samperio, but with respect to
the practice of law, it is important to distinguish between licensure and
employment.137 Though federal law may prohibit undocumented
immigrants from working for employers in settings like law firms, courts,
and governmental agencies, proponents argue this is not the relevant
inquiry—because the ability to gain future employment is never part of the
calculation in state bar admissions.138 Individuals with student visas, for
example, are regularly granted law licenses, regardless of their ability to be
employed in the practice of law. An act passed by the California legislature
in 2005, for example, allows those who are ineligible for a social security
number to apply for state bar admission.139
It also true that obtaining a license to practice law does not necessarily
mean an individual will seek employment in the United States. The amici
for Mr. Garcia noted, for example, that undocumented immigrants could
use a law license to provide pro bono legal services or advise clients outside
the United States.140 Perhaps most significantly, undocumented immigrants
act-1986-irca (last visited Feb. 6, 2015) (noting that IRCA was “passed in order to control
and deter illegal immigration to the United States,” by instituting employment penalties and
exercising increased border patrol).
135. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(b)(1)(B)(i)–(ii) (providing that employment verification can be
established with a valid United States passport or “resident alien card, alien registration card,
or other document designated by the Attorney General . . .”).
136. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(f)(1) (providing that these penalties will be applied to
employers engaging “in a pattern or practice of violations”).
137. See Harris Amici, supra note 95, at 22–23 (defining licensure as “an
acknowledgement by this Court that a candidate has met the requirement for entry into the
profession regardless of whether the licensee ever practices law,” which is a distinct from
whether the individual may be legally employed).
138. See id. at 23 (noting that “[t]he State Bar and this Court do not generally inquire
about whether an individual intended to be employed as an attorney before granting a license
to practice law . . . .”).
139. See id. at 24 (citing CAL BUS. & PROF CODE § 6060.6 (2005) which, “establishes
that foreign nationals may be admitted to practice law, even though they may not be able to
be employed in the United States.”).
140. See id. (adding that “the ease with which individuals can communicate over the
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could potentially be employed as solo practitioners or “independent
contractors,” irrespective of federal work authorization.141
While there may be the potential for legal work as an “independent
contractor,” opponents of admission have raised concerns about the ability
of undocumented immigrants to effectively serve clients based on the threat
of deportation.142 In response to this concern, however, Mr. Garcia’s
supporters noted that state bar associations generally do not consider
immigration status for character and fitness purposes.143
Instead,
supporters argue deportation should be treated like any other potential
danger that could compromise the attorney-client relationship, noting that,
“similar risks exist for all attorneys, any of whom could experience a life
event—an illness, accident, disability, or other emergency—that interferes
with their obligations to clients.”144
Supporters in Mr. Garcia’s case also argued that current federal
immigration policy does not affect the ability to advise clients as a solo
practitioner or provide pro bono legal services.145 An amicus brief
submitted by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) on behalf of Mr.
Garcia, for example, argued, “these requirements do not generally apply to
the work of persons who own their own businesses, such as bona fide
independents contractors, or to non-remunerative work.”146 This distinction
is based on Department of Homeland Security (DHS) regulations, which
provide that restrictions on “employers” and “employees,” like those found
internet and the global nature of the economy, it is possible to practice law from outside of
the country, as do many other foreign nationals who receive a Bar licensure pursuant to
section 6060.6.”).
141. See Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. at 20 as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, In re Garcia, 315 P.3d 117 (Cal. 2014) (No. S202512) 2012 WL
3236333 [hereinafter ACLU Amici] (arguing that independent contractors are distinguished
from the term “employee” under federal law).
142. See id.
143. See In re Garcia, 315 P.3d 117, 134 (Cal. 2014) (determining that “‘[g]ood moral
character’ has traditionally been defined as the absence of conduct imbued with elements of
‘moral turpitude’. . . includ[ing] ‘qualities of honesty, fairness, candor, trustworthiness, [and]
observance of fiduciary responsibility. . .” (quoting In re Menna, 11 Cal. 4th 975, 983 (1995)
(internal citations omitted))).
144. See Harris Amici, supra note 95, at 23 (noting that “[a]ll attorneys are ethically
obligated to plan for such eventualities by securing adequate representation for their clients,
and courts may also intervene to protect a client (citing CAL BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 6180,
6190)).
145. See ACLU Amici, supra note 141, at 18 (arguing that this would not require work
authorization from any employer subject to federal employment law related to immigration).
146. Id. at 20.
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in IRCA, are only triggered when services or labor for wages are
involved.147 Significantly, those same regulations, as the ACLU notes, also
create a specific exception for “independent contractors.”148 Apart from the
question of licensure, this led the ACLU to contend that Mr. Garcia’s
employment as a solo practitioner would be proper based on the distinction
in the DHS regulations.149
There is also an argument that work as a solo practitioner could expose
clients of undocumented immigrants to liability under federal law.
According to the ACLU, however, “under the federal regulations, when a
client retains a lawyer, the client is not an employer” of the undocumented
attorney.150 Because a client is not an “employer”, they are not be exposed
to civil or criminal penalties contained in IRCA,151 and, “therefore ha[ve]
no obligation to refrain from retaining an unauthorized alien or to verify the
work authorization status of the attorney.”152
In response, opponents note that the distinction between licensure and
employment need not be addressed. According to the DOJ, because § 1621
works to preclude the possibility of licensure entirely, employment as a
practicing attorney is not possible for any undocumented immigrant,
regardless of the setting.153 Reiterating that “authorization to work is
determined exclusively by reference to federal law,” the DOJ noted that
even if an undocumented immigrant did possess a state law license—as Mr.
Garcia now does—any potential employer is subject to civil and criminal
penalties if they “knowingly hire, recruit, refer, or continue to employ
unauthorized workers . . . .”154 The DOJ amicus brief also notes that, “the
147. See id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 274a.1(f) which states “[t]he term employee means an
individual who provides services or labor for an employer for wages or other remuneration
but does not mean independent contractors . . .”).
148. ACLU Amici, supra note 95, at 20.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See ACLU Amici, supra note 95, at 21 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 274a.1(g) which states,
“[i]n the case of an independent contractor or contract labor or services, the term employer
shall mean the independent contractor or contractor and not the person or entity using the
contract labor[.]” (emphasis added)).
152. Id.
153. See DOJ Amici, supra note 106, at 2 (concluding further that “the Court need not
reach the question whether bar admission would imply that Mr. Garcia may lawfully work in
the United States”).
154. See id. at 4 (citing 8 U.S.C. §1324a(a)(1)(A)); see also 8 U.S.C. §1324(B)(i)
(noting that any employer who attempts to hire or knowingly employs an unauthorized alien
“for the purpose of commercial advantage or private financial gain” is subject to a fine or
imprisonment of not more than ten years or both).
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United States does not endorse the assertion that any particular use of a law
license would comply with relevant federal law.”155 Absent government
authorization, the DOJ affirmatively rejected the idea that federal law
would authorize legal employment for a licensed, undocumented immigrant
like Mr. Garcia or Mr. Godinez-Samperio.156
IV. Recommendation
A. Introduction
While Mr. Garcia’s case suggests that law licenses for undocumented
immigrants can be reduced to a question of statutory interpretation, Mr.
Godinez-Samperio’s experience represents the bigger challenges facing
first-generation Plyler students. Aside from the California law benefitting
Mr. Garcia, highly educated young people living elsewhere in the United
States, who were brought to this country illegally by their parents, continue
to face challenges presented by inconsistencies in immigration policy.
While members of the Plyler generation, like Mr. Godinez-Samperio, have
pursued the education that policies like DACA seem to encourage,
PRWORA’s nearly two-decade old prohibition on “public benefits,” places
an obstacle between that education and its corresponding career
opportunities.157 Comprehensive legislation is the most direct route toward
removing PRWORA’s barrier, but congressional inaction on immigration
makes that an unlikely solution.
In the absence of legislation, a regulation promulgated by the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) clarifying PRWORA’s ban on
“public benefits,” is an important first step toward fostering consistency in
United States immigration policy. Just as DACA affords protection from
deportation and an opportunity for lawful employment to qualified young
155. Id. at 14 (citing Matter of Tong, 16 I&N Dec. 593 (BIA 1978), which held that
“self-employment qualifies as working without authorization”).
156. See id. at 14 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 274a.5 (2009) addressing the use of labor through
contract, and stating, “individuals who obtain the labor or services of an alien in the United
States knowing that the alien is an unauthorized alien with respect to performing such labor
or services,” violates federal law).
157. See J. Austin Smithson, Educate Then Exile: Creating A Double Standard in
Education for Plyler Students Who Want to Sit for the Bar Exam, 11 SCHOLAR 87, 103
(2008) (“The current system of laws in the United States allows a Plyler student to receive a
primary and secondary education, attend college and even law school; but, at the same time
the United States criminalizes their immigration status, thus preventing them from fully
developing their education . . . .”).
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people, a DHS regulation could help ensure those same individuals are able
to pursue all forms of employment—including jobs that require a law
license.158 It is important to note, however, that this proposal is intended to
be a short-term solution. The fact remains that only comprehensive
immigration reform from Congress will ensure highly educated young
people are able to share the full range of their professional skills with
society.
B. A DHS Regulation Clarifying PRWORA’s Prohibitions
As the agency responsible for enforcing federal immigration law, the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has the authority to promulgate a
regulation interpreting PRWORA’s prohibition on “public benefits.”159
Currently tasked with interpreting and implementing laws enacted by
Congress in the form of regulations, an interpretation of PRWORA’s ban
on “public benefits” would properly come within the purview of DHS.160
This addition would also be consistent with the body of DHS regulations
found in Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.), addressing
“Aliens and Nationality.”161
Under Title 8, DHS has previously issued several regulations
clarifying federal law on benefits and employment for undocumented
immigrants in other contexts.162
Under 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12, first
promulgated in 2007, for example, DHS identified numerous classes of
aliens authorized to accept employment in the United States.163 Among
those eligible are “alien[s] having extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts,
education, business,”164 and “alien[s] whose enforced departure from the
United States has been deferred in accordance with a directive from the
President of the United States to the Secretary [of Homeland
158. See DACA Memo, supra note 52, at 1 (explaining that one purpose of the program
is “to ensure that our enforcement resources are not expended on these low priority cases but
are instead appropriately focused on people who meet our enforcement priorities.”).
159. See U.S CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., Title 8 Code of Federal Regulations,
available at http://www.uscis.gov/laws/8-cfr/title-8-code-federal-regulations (last visited
Feb. 6, 2014).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12 (2014).
163. Id.
164. See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(b)(13) (requiring that the alien’s employer acts as a
sponsor).

PLYLER STUDENTS AT WORK

593

Security] . . . . ”165 As to the latter category, which would include those
approved for DACA, the regulations provide that those individuals are
“authorized to be employed in the United States without restrictions as to
location or type of employment.”166 A regulation clarifying that
PRWORA’s ban on “public benefits” does not prevent those approved for
DACA from obtaining a license to enter the legal profession could be
addressed in a similar fashion.
Until Congress is prepared to legislate on the issue of immigration, this
type of regulation could serve as a temporary measure consistent with
earlier executive action on federal immigration policy. Just as DACA and
the regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12 reflect an effort to fully integrate the
first generation of Plyler students into society, a regulation clarifying that
PRWORA does not prevent those individuals from entering the practice of
law strengthens that commitment. In her memorandum formally
introducing DACA, for example, Secretary of Homeland Security, Janet
Napolitano, noted that an exercise of prosecutorial discretion was
appropriate for those brought to this country illegally as children, because
“[a]s a general matter, these individuals lacked the intent violate the
law.”167 Extending that rationale to remove a federal barrier to law
licensure is equally appropriate, because it reflects the general premise
behind DACA. Specifically, it allows all young, qualified, individuals to
realize the full range of educational and employment opportunities
available to them, rather than suffer exclusion because of a status they did
not choose, and a decision they did not make.168
While it is true that law licenses are a state issue, an exercise of federal
discretion to permit this “public benefit” would not conflict with that
power.169 A regulation approaching law licenses in the way that DACA
approaches employment would only remove a federal barrier based on
165. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(a)(11).
166. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(a) (emphasis added).
167. See DACA Memo, supra note 52, at 2 (stating that “many of these young people
have already contributed to our country in significant ways,” and that “[p]rosecutorial
discretion, which is used in so many other areas, is especially justified here”).
168. See Smithson, supra note 157, at 103 (defending a similar argument that refusing
to allow undocumented students to sit for the bar exam, “perpetuates an ‘underclass’ of
individuals within America’s borders, which is the exact circumstance the Supreme Court
sought to avoid,” with its ruling in Plyler (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 (1982)).
169. See DACA Memo, supra note 52, at 3 (“This memorandum confers no substantive
right, immigration status or pathway to citizenship . . . . It remains for the executive branch,
however, to set forth policy for the exercise of discretion within the framework of existing
law.”).
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immigration status; it would not alter existing state authority over bar
admissions. 170 Instead, a regulation that exempts law licenses from the
PRWORA’s prohibition on public benefits would protect states from
violating federal law by admitting undocumented immigrants to the state
bar, similar to the way that DACA protects employers from violating the
federal prohibition on hiring undocumented immigrants under IRCA.171
Reforming federal law to allow for this eligibility, coupled with DACA’s
opportunity for employment authorization, could also allow employers to
legally hire undocumented young professionals to work in more traditional
legal settings, including law firms, courts, and governmental agencies.172
C. Public Policy Rationale for this Standard
As states have begun to increase accessibility to higher education for
undocumented immigrants, and federal policies like DACA have created
opportunities to gain employment through legal means, a DHS regulation
clarifying that PRWORA is not a barrier to law licenses would foster
consistency in existing immigration policy at the state and federal levels. 173
Rather than continue with an approach that supports the availability of a
legal education for young undocumented immigrants, but shuts them out of
the legal profession because it requires a license, a logical development in
federal immigration policy is to extend them the opportunity for
licensure.174 Allowing young, undocumented immigrants to receive work
170. See Michele Waslin, Can Deferred Action Beneficiaries Get Driver’s Licenses?,
AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Aug. 14, 2012), http://immigrationimpact.com/2012/08/14/candeferred-action-beneficiaries-get-drivers-licenses/
(considering the impact of DACA on state eligibility requirements for a driver’s license,
noting “[d]eferred action itself is not an immigration status” and those approved receive an
employment authorization document and a Social Security number, which may or may not
be enough for a driver’s license in some states).
171. See DACA and Workplace Rights, NAT’L IMMIGR. LAW CTR., (Nov. 2012),
http://www.nilc.org/dacaworkplacerights.html (noting that individuals approved for DACA
may receive an Employment Authorization Document (EAD), which is a type of work
permit allowing legal employment in the U.S.).
172. Id.
173. Id.; see also NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 55.
174. See Smithson, supra note 157, at 104 (referencing undocumented students
prohibited from state bar exams, noting they “are faced with a similar problem as the
undocumented children in Plyler who wanted to receive a free public education; they are
prevented from furthering their education in America because of their undocumented
status.”).
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authorization for some forms of employment under DACA, but
simultaneously prohibiting them from careers requiring a professional
license, reflects a hesitance to fully integrate this group of individuals into
society.175 A DHS regulation providing a current interpretation of
PRWORA’s 1996 ban on “public benefits” is the most effective way to
address current inconsistencies in immigration policy.
An examination of the timing and rationale behind PRWORA also
makes clear that its “public benefit” restriction pre-dates, and did not
contemplate the educational trajectory of Plyler students like Mr. GodinezSamperio, who have earned a degree in law.176 Although the 1996 federal
law works to prohibit law licenses for undocumented immigrants, this
prohibition is not consistent with the purpose of PRWORA itself.
Specifically, the purpose of the Act was to increase accountability for the
provision of welfare benefits to America’s poor, and scale back
governmental assistance to all recipients.177 Reforming the current approach
to professional licensure at the federal level would not hamper these goals.
In fact, a policy of inclusion for undocumented immigrants to the
practice of law would likely further the overarching goals of PRWORA,
despite its current preventative effects.178 With respect to § 1621’s ban on
“public benefits” for example, one primary goal of PRWORA was to
encourage self-sufficiency and lessen the burden on states to provide for
those living in the United States without government authorization.179
Another objective was promoting self-reliance and ensuring that “aliens
within the Nation’s borders not depend on public resources to meet their
needs, but rather rely on their own capabilities.”180 Allowing a DACA175. See id. at 106 (“The current system encourages undocumented immigrant students
to remain in the United States after graduating from high school, but sharply changes the
landscape for those who continue to stay after high school graduation.”).
176. See 8 U.S.C. § 1621(c)(1)(A) (2013) (making aliens who are not qualified aliens
ineligible for state or local public benefits including, “professional license[s] . . . provided by
an agency of a state or local government or by appropriated funds of a State or local
government”).
177. See O’CONNOR, supra note 92, at 227 (“Advocates of the PRWORA asserted that
time limits and work requirements are the best way of ‘rehabilitating’ recipients and getting
them on the road to self-sufficiency.”).
178. See id. (“It legislated into action a system that attempts as much as possible to
replace welfare with paid work, offering only temporary and limited government
assistance.”).
179. See Harris Amici, supra note 95, at 29 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1601, Pub. L. 113-31
(2013) (outlining the purposes for enacting PRWORA with respect to national policy on
immigration and welfare)).
180. See id. at 29 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1601(2)(A), Pub. L. 113–31 (2013)).

596

21 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 567 (2015)

approved individual—who has obtained an undergraduate and law degree
in the United States, has passed a state bar exam, and has demonstrated the
requisite character and fitness to enter the practice of law—seems to be well
in line with the aforementioned goals of independence and economic selfreliance that Congress hoped to achieve with the passage of PRWORA.
This reform is also consistent with the right to public education for
those brought to this country illegally as children. In the decades since the
Supreme Court’s decision in Plyler,181 states have extended that precedent
beyond the K-12 setting. State laws allowing undocumented immigrants to
attend state universities and qualify for in-state tuition—effectively
encouraging the possibility and pursuit of a professional degree—are just
one example.182 As the California Attorney General noted in Mr. Garcia’s
case, for example, “[a]dmitting qualified undocumented immigrants to
practice law would be consistent with the legislature’s view that California
is served by encouraging them to pursue an education.”183 The move
toward increased access to higher education for undocumented immigrants
in California and states across the county lends additional support to the
removal of PRWORA’s national barrier to state law licensure. To this end,
a federal prohibition on “public benefits” should not stand in the way of
allowing high-achieving students to share the benefits of their education
with society.
Though opponents to such reform would be correct in pointing out that
an undocumented immigrant’s presence in the United States violates federal
immigration law, such conduct does not necessarily preclude eligibility for
state bar admission.184 In Mr. Garcia’s case, for example, the California
Supreme Court ruled that, “every intentional violation of the law is not, ipso
facto, grounds for excluding an individual from membership in the legal
profession.”185 The Court supported this conclusion with the United States
181. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (holding that the Texas statute could not
“deny a discrete group of innocent children the free public education that it offers to other
children residing within its borders, that denial must be justified by a showing that it furthers
some substantial state interest.”).
182. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 55.
183. See Harris Amici, supra note 95, at 3 (“It also would track state policies that
acknowledge and encourage the positive contributions that undocumented immigrants make
to society as a whole.”).
184. Id. at 21 (acknowledging that illegal entry into the United States can be charged as
a misdemeanor under 8 U.S.C. § 1325, but that entry at a young age makes such an action
unlikely, particularly since the five year statute of limitations has already passed in Mr.
Garcia’s case).
185. See Garcia on Admission, supra note 82 at 22 (noting that when bar applicants

PLYLER STUDENTS AT WORK

597

Supreme Court ruling in In re Griffiths, where it found that any attempt to
condition state bar admission on United States citizenship violates the
Equal Protection Clause.186
As for character and fitness considerations after eligibility, the
California Court found that immigration status should have no effect in this
respect either.
Specifically, it determined that “the fact that an
undocumented immigrant is present in the United States without lawful
authorization does not itself involve moral turpitude or demonstrate moral
unfitness so as to justify exclusion from the State Bar, or prevent the
individual from taking an oath promising faithfully to discharge the duty to
support the Constitution and laws of the United States . . . .”187 The Court
went on to note that although illegal entry and unauthorized presence in the
United States carry civil penalties and the threat of deportation, neither is a
criminal offense or an act that automatically disqualifies an applicant from
state bar admission.188 Additionally, once an individual is approved for
DACA, the federal government no longer considers that person an
undocumented immigrant for the purpose of incurring civil liability.189 This
provides further support that a presumption in favor of eligibility for their
admission to the practice of law would be proper.
Reforming the federal approach to state bar admissions for those
approved for DACA would also have no impact on an individual’s current
immigration status or federal laws regulating employment for those who are
undocumented.190 In fact, the California Supreme Court determined that “it
would be inappropriate to deny a law license to such an individual on the
basis of an assumption that he or she will not comply with the existing
have committed a past crime, “the circumstances surrounding the commission of the act
must reveal some independent act beyond the bare fact of a criminal conviction to show that
the act demonstrates moral unfitness . . . .”) (quoting Hallinan v. Comm. of Bar Examiners,
65 Cal.2d 447, 459 (1966) (internal citations omitted)).
186. See In re Griffiths, supra note 74.
187. See Garcia on Admission, supra note 82, at 22.
188. Id. at 23 (determining the broad discretion of immigration officials make it
unlikely they would pursue “an undocumented immigrant who has been living in this
country for a substantial period of time, who has been educated here, and whose only
unlawful conduct is unlawful presence in this country.”).
189. See Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), U.S.
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/considerationdeferred-action-childhood-arrivals-process (last updated Sept. 9, 2014) (“Deferred action is a
use of prosecutorial discretion to defer removal action against an individual for a certain
period of time.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice).
190. See id. (“Deferred action does not provide lawful status.”).
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restrictions on employment imposed by federal law.”191 According to the
Court, even the inability to represent clients on account of citizenship does
not make licensure improper or “necessarily preclude all possible uses of a
law license.”192
In conclusion, while states could formally enact laws like California’s,
the most logical and efficient solution lies with federal reform. Rather than
require states to explicitly override PRWORA’s ban on “public benefits,”
federal recognition of eligibility for a law license would create greater
uniformity with immigration policy on education and employment. It also
furthers PRWORA’s goal of fostering self-sufficiency and economic
independence.193 Moreover, this reform is consistent with the expansion of
higher education opportunities for undocumented immigrants at the state
level as well. Most importantly, this reform would represent a significant
step forward toward greater integration of Plyler students into society.
D. Economic Benefits of This Standard
In addition to being good social policy, there is also an important
economic benefit associated with allowing undocumented immigrants to
receive law licenses. Such a grant would allow for a larger, more educated,
and more affluent tax base to support the country.194 A shift toward
expanded employment opportunities for undocumented immigrants,
particularly those who are highly skilled, would provide this economic
benefit at both the state and national level.195 More specifically, as
191. See Garcia on Admission, supra note 82, at 28–29 (concluding that the court relies
on a presumption that all licensed attorneys will “comply with their ethical obligations to act
in accordance with all applicable legal constraints . . . .”).
192. Id. at 25 (determining that Mr. Garcia would still be permitted to use his law
license in ways that comply with existing federal employment law for undocumented
immigrants); see also Harris Amici, supra note 95, at 24 (noting that Mr. Garcia could also
teach courses in law or advise clients living outside the United States).
193. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 55; see also
O’CONNOR, supra note 92.
194. See Raúl Hinojosa-Ojeda, Raising the Floor for American Workers: The Economic
Benefits of Comprehensive Immigration Reform 1, IMMIGRATION POL’Y CTR. (Jan. 2010),
available
at
http://www.ab540.ucla.edu/documents/immigrationeconreport_000.pdf
(estimating that “comprehensive immigration reform would yield at least $1.5 trillion in
cumulative U.S. gross domestic product over 10 years”).
195. See The Cost of Doing Nothing: Dollars, Lives and Opportunities Lost in the Wait
for Immigration Reform, IMMIGRATION POL’Y CTR. 5–6 (Sept. 23, 2013) (estimating benefits
at the state level and noting in Virginia, for example, “[t]he wages of unauthorized workers
would increase by $1.2 billion, generating an additional $371 million in tax revenue and
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immigration scholars like Dr. Raúl Hinojosa-Ojeda have recognized,
“removing the uncertainty of unauthorized status allows legalized
immigrants to earn higher wages and move into higher-paying occupations,
and also encourages them to invest more in their own education, open bank
accounts, buy homes, and start businesses.”196 PRWORA’s current
limitations stand in the way of this potential economic progress.
Though still in its early stages, DACA has shown the potential benefits
of such an approach. Since the policy was introduced in June 2012,
approximately sixty-one percent of the 455,000 individuals approved for
deferred action have obtained employment, fifty-four percent have opened
their first bank account, and thirty-eight percent were approved for their
first credit card.197 These statistics demonstrate the additional benefits that
would come from removing the federal barrier to state bar admission for
undocumented individuals who have earned a degree in law.
Though opponents may contend that such an approach will lead to an
influx of undocumented immigrants, that result is unlikely. The limited
application of this reform—to those brought to this country as children,
who have obtained a degree in law, and passed a state bar examination,
make such an influx doubtful.198 In fact, similar arguments were raised in
opposition to the availability of in-state tuition rates for undocumented
immigrants, but the effect of that reform has proved to be positive.199

creating 27,000 new jobs”) (citing Raúl Hinojosa-Ojeda, The Consequences of Legalization
Versus Mass Deportation in Virginia, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Aug. 2012)).
196. Id.; Hinojosa-Ojeda, supra note 194, at 9.
197. See Roberto G. Gonzales & Veronica Terriquez, How DACA Is Impacting the
Lives of Those Who Are Now DACAmented, IMMIGRATION POL’Y CTR. 2 (2013), available at
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/how-daca-impacting-lives-those-who-are-nowdacamented (analyzing a national survey of 1,402 individuals between ages 18 and 31 years
old who were eligible for DACA prior to June 2013).
198. See Basic Facts About In-State Tuition for Undocumented Immigrant Students,
NAT’L IMMIGRATION L. CTR. 3 (revised June 2014), available at http://www.nilc.org/basicfacts-instate.html (finding that only 5 to10 percent of undocumented high school graduates
in the United States go on to college, meaning “[i]n most states, we are talking about only a
few dozen or a few hundred particularly talented students.”).
199. Id. at 2 (“Each person who attends college and obtains a professional job means
one less drain on the social service (and possibly criminal justice) budgets of the state and an
asset in terms of payment of taxes and the attraction to the state of high-wage employers
seeking well-educated workers.”); see also The Effects of In-State Tuition for Non-Citizens:
A Systematic Review of the Evidence 3, THE LATINO POL’Y INST. AT ROGER WILLIAMS UNIV.
(2011), available at http://www.rwu.edu/sites/default/files/lpi-report.pdf (finding that “instate tuition is correlated with a 31% increase in enrollment at institutes of higher education
by non-citizens.”).
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V. Conclusion

Although Mr. Garcia’s fight for a law license was ultimately
successful because of the California legislature,200 Mr. Godinez-Samperio’s
experience demonstrates the need for comprehensive reform. Current
federal policy does not reflect the changing profile of undocumented
immigrants living in the United States.201 It is also inconsistent with the
educational opportunities afforded to Plyler students,202 and DACA’s
opportunity for employment authorization.203 For this country to reap the
social and fiscal benefits of these protections, undocumented students who
are prepared for the practice of law should not be shut out because a law
license is deemed a “public benefit.”204 Until Congress is prepared to
provide comprehensive immigration reform, a DHS regulation removing
PRWORA’s barrier to law licensure for young undocumented immigrants
is an important first step in this process.

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

See A.B. No. 1024, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013).
See Smithson, supra note 157.
See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 55.
See DACA and Workplace Rights, supra note 171.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1621(c)(1)(A), supra note 176.

